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While postneoliberalism is often interpreted as a societal reaction against the deleterious effects of 
marketization in Latin America, this paper develops a finer-grained Polanyian institutional analysis to 
gain better analytical purchase on the ambivalent outcomes of postneoliberal reforms. Drawing on 
recent insights in economic geography, and in dialogue with the Latin American structuralist tradi-
tion, we elaborate our framework through a case study of the Argentinian soy boom of the 2000s, 
identifying forms of market extension, redistribution, reciprocity and householding that facilitated 
this process. We argue for a multi-scalar approach that balances attention to national and extra-local 
dynamics shaping the combination of these forms, identified through the lens of the “fictitious com-
modities” of the soy boom: money (credit, currency and cross-border capital flows), land (in the agri-
cultural heartland and frontier regions), labor (transformed and excluded in a “farming without farm-
ers” model) and, we add, knowledge (biotech). Our analysis identifies internal tensions as well as 
overt resistance and “overflow” that ultimately led to the collapse of postneoliberal regulation of the 
soy complex, ushering in a wider, market radical counter-movement. Refracting double-movement-
type dynamics through the prism of heterodox institutional forms, we argue, allows for a better grasp 




Latin America’s recent history is often read as a succession of (counter)movements: from the 
dismantling of the developmental state via neoliberal reforms, to a popular reaction heralding a neo-
developmentalist and redistributive turn. As the “postneoliberal” transformation in the region began 
its second decade, however, and a second generation of leaders was tasked with turning “easy” redis-
tribution under conditions of commodity price booms into “deep” transformation in times of com-
modity price lows, the weaknesses of these varied projects were threatening past gains and dampen-
ing future prospects. The election of Mauricio Macri and the legislative coup against Dilma Rousseff 
signal a re-capture of the state by authoritarian neoliberal champions in Argentina and Brazil, respec-
tively. Ecuador and Bolivia face emboldened oppositions and significant political and economic lim-
its to their redistributive projects, while Venezuela’s governability crisis only seems to deepen.  
While postneoliberalism in Latin America has been widely interpreted through the Polanyian 
lens of the double movement, in this paper we argue that Polanyian institutional analysis is more ade-
quate to the task of understanding postneoliberal transformations and their limits. Our argument is 
inspired by Michael Burawoy’s recuperation of a Polanyian perspective that shifts political economic 
analysis from identifying terminal crises to interpreting the institutional mix that stabilizes capitalism 
through societal transformations. For Polanyi, Burawoy writes, society “was a conceptual innovation 
to grasp the longevity of capitalism, [that is,] its failure to succumb to laws that Marx has laid down 
for it” (2003: 198). Conceptually, we draw on Jamie Peck’s notion of Polanyian economic geogra-
phies as a methodological impetus to study economies through their variously stable and shifting pat-
terns of institutionalization (2013a; 2013b). The ultimate aim of this Polanyi-plus heterodox approach 
is to balance an understanding of patterned contradictions of capitalist accumulation with the varie-
gated, historically specific institutional forms that mediate and moderate those tensions (Ibid.).  
We develop our approach by elaborating a Polanyian institutional analysis of Argentina 
through the lens of the country’s principal export, the soybean, and its variegated, postneoliberal 
transformations. Our argument proceeds in three steps. In section 2, we develop a “Polanyi-plus” 
reading of postneoliberalism in dialogue with Latin American structuralism to highlight the signifi-
cance of multiscalar, multi-institutional accounts of de/marketization. We argue that a Polanyian 
reading of postneoliberalism must move away from market and state/society dualisms and instead 
refract double-movement-type changes through Polanyi’s institutional forms: markets, reciprocity, 
redistribution and householding. In postneoliberal Latin America, we contend, Polanyi’s “fictitious 
commodities” continued to be de/marketized via a geographically variegated combination of these 
diverse forms. We proceed to introduce our stylized case study of Argentina’s soy boom in section 
three, outlining the geographical, organizational and technological shifts that supported it. We then 
move to the core of our analysis in our fourth section, drawing on interviews and analysis of primary 
 2 
source documents undertaken by Berndt in Argentina during three research visits of two to three 
weeks between 2014 and 2018. We analyze the institutional recalibrations regulating the fictitious 
commodities of the Argentinian soy boom: knowledge (biotech), money (credit, currency and cross-
border capital flows), land (in the agricultural heartland and frontier regions) and labor (transformed 
and excluded in a “farming without farmers” model). We identify the various “overflows” and re-
sistances to the contingent re-arrangement of these heterodox institutional forms, which introduced 
instabilities and subsequently propelled a market-radical counter-movement. In developing this analy-
sis, our ultimate aim is to understand the persistence of the Argentine economy’s subordination to 
primary sector exports and the possibilities and limits to transforming the institutional patterns that 
sustain it.  
2. Postneoliberal transformations through a Polanyian institutional lens 
While characterizations of postneoliberalism in Latin America are far from uniform (see 
Yates and Bakker, 2013), Polanyi’s notion of the double movement has been widely utilized to asso-
ciate the term with social movement reactions to the devastating consequences of marketization (e.g. 
Sader, 2009; Silva, 2009; Panizza, 2009). As Munck writes, “Polanyi’s brilliant intuition of a counter-
movement emerging to contest the free market finds in contemporary Latin America a rich labora-
tory…”(2015: 3). Opposition to the dismantling of social protections and the privatization of public 
goods eventually propelled the election of left-wing governments that pushed back against neoliberal 
dictates and implemented programs of redistribution and recognition. Munck (Ibid.) and others (e.g., 
Goodwin, 2018), however, use the concept judiciously, cautioning, for instance, against reducing in-
digenous and peasant movements to resistance against the neoliberal marketization of land given the 
much longer colonial trajectory of such struggles.  
Additional limits to the double movement framework have become evident as theory has 
struggled to catch up with developments on the ground. Writing on Argentina, Gago (2014) notes 
how postneoliberal projects of redistribution and recognition have been imbricated with a deepening 
of the marketization of nature. In regards to soy expansion in particular, Lapegna (2017) documents 
state-facilitated, market-led forms of dispossession, and the resulting reluctant accommodation of 
peasants to the extractivist apparatus. Analyzing events in South America more widely, scholars note 
key disjunctures between an antagonistic state discourse vis-à-vis neoliberalism bolstered by policies 
of recognition and redistribution, on the one hand, and the intensification of accumulation via ex-
tractivism, on the other (e.g., Postero, 2017; Svampa 2013). In short, when analyzing new develop-
mentalist trajectories and the institutional struggles accompanying them, “neoliberal” and “post-
neoliberal” realities in Latin America cannot be reduced to mechanistic movements between state 
and market that imply the linear substitution of one for the other. The state has played a guiding 
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economic role and can never be simply considered as an external check on the market (Fernández, 
2016). 
These critiques are not grounds to abandon Polanyi, however. Instead, they signal the need 
for scholars to better parse continuity and change in de/marketization dynamics conceptually identi-
fiable as – but insufficiently explained by – the double movement. We outline two strategic moves 
towards this goal. First, we mobilize Polanyi’s insights into the economy as an instituted process in 
order to construct a Polanyian reading of postneoliberalism based upon his “quadrinity” of ideal-type 
institutional forms (1957; 2001[1944]; see Peck, 2013a). In so doing, we conceptualize the process of 
regulation as a set of situated struggles over the mix of these forms, driven from stability to change 
by internal contradictions as well as overflows and resistance. Second, we consider Polanyi’s discus-
sion of fictitious commodities in relation to Latin American structuralism and its inheritors. We do 
this in order to foreground the multiscalar nature of de/marketization dynamics, which are not suffi-
ciently developed in Polanyi’s original formulation.  
Polanyi’s keen attention to how economies are instituted offers a more precise analytical 
framework than the double movement to understand how tensions and overflows emerge from mar-
ketization processes to achieve temporary stability through a dynamic reconfiguration of institutional 
forms. Polanyi identified four forms, each associated with a particular social pattern: price-making 
markets, grounded in what he called “market society”; reciprocity, stabilized by symmetrical ties of 
kinship and community; redistribution, undertaken by collection into and allocation from a center 
(usually, the state), and householding, autonomous allocations within family units (1957; 2001[1944]). 
Importantly, he rejected these forms as stages or sequences of development, writing that “no se-
quence in time is implied. Several subordinate forms may be present alongside the dominant one, 
which may itself recur after a temporary eclipse” (1957: 256). Seen through this “quadrinity”, what 
Polanyi initially described as the double movement – the impetus of society to “react back” to hyper-
marketization – can be reformulated as a “dialectical recalibration of institutional arrangements 
brought on by destructive overreach of commodification/marketization” (Peck, 2013a: 1559).  
  Polanyi identified this destructive overreach in the extension of price-making markets to 
what he termed “fictitious commodities”. The commodification of land, labor and money through 
shifts in technology, commercial norms and state regulations, and their circulation via market mecha-
nisms, became the sine qua non of 19th century industrial capitalism in Western Europe. “[T]he ele-
ments of industry,” Polanyi wrote, “had to be on sale” (2001[1944]: 78). Importantly, Polanyi’s con-
cept disrupted the fallacious conceit that economic value is immanent to a thing rather than a social 
relation (Jessop, 2007). Not a denial of the reality of the commodity form, “fictitiousness” high-
lighted the institutional maneuvering necessary to regulate the basic elements of industry via the mar-
ket mechanism (cf. Christophers, 2016). Polanyi located the primary contradiction at the heart of 
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capitalist industrialization in this process of commodification. The making of land, labor and money 
into commodities – or more precisely, their regulation via the market mechanism – provoked varied 
forms of social reaction since the extension of the market undermined the very existence of labor, 
nature and businesses as “elements of industry” and of society itself.  
Our argument to reconsider fictitious commodities and the dialectical recalibration of their 
instituted form in countries that occupy a peripheral position in the global economy allows us to go 
beyond Polanyi’s original thinking and adapt it to postneoliberal Latin America. Although Polanyi 
discussed the commodification of land and labor in colonial contexts, he tended to exaggerate their 
marketization (Burawoy, 2013; e.g., Polanyi’s discussion of “nature’s penalty” in particular [Polanyi, 
2001(1944): 173]); he can also be criticized for romanticizing the role of social communities (Fraser, 
2014). Latin American structuralists and radical Marxists, despite their differences, understood well 
that the de/commodification of land, labor and money was partially a global affair. In Polanyian 
terms, the expansion and deepening of commodification in one locale not only provoked double 
movement reactions for social protection in that place, but also shaped the highly uneven, integrated 
and dynamic pattern of commodification worldwide: capital not only changed locations, but also 
shifted in organizational form in reaction to de/marketization processes. Insights into these extra-
local dynamics were advanced early on by Raúl Prebisch, who argued that the social protections en-
joyed by a subset of (mostly white, male) workers in the post-WWII period in the global North were 
inseparable from the position of core capital itself. Analyzing the “old” international division of labor 
of the mid-20th century, industrial workers’ relatively high wages, and the partial decommodification 
of their social reproduction through state-sponsored welfare provision, was maintained structurally 
by high prices for industrial goods sold to the periphery, rather than the low prices that should have 
followed from increases in productivity (Prebisch, 1959). Seen through a Polanyian lens, this partial 
decommodification of “core” labor was determined by two distinct, but inter-related processes: first, 
classic “double movement” reactions to hypermarketization of the late 19th and early 20th centuries in 
the North Atlantic, which yielded a new institutional arrangement (i.e., Fordism), and second, extra-
local forms of redistribution whereby surplus from the global South was apportioned to the benefi-
ciaries of the Fordist bargain in the global North. This further forced Latin America into the role of a 
supplier of agricultural commodities and natural resources.  
From a reformulated Polanyian perspective, the key question is how land, labor and money 
continue to be de/marketized in a geographically variegated mix of diverse institutional forms that 
determine their de/commodification in given contexts. In principle, it also allows us to include the 
realm of production in addition to market relations. Analysis of these stabilized combinations and 
their transformations must necessarily include an assessment of both the continuing importance of 
“internal” dynamics as well as the degree of importance of external, extra-local ones. In both 
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instances, state actors play a crucial role in regulating the particular way in which Polanyi’s fictitious 
commodities are de/marketized. This approach allows for a fuller account of the multiscalar forces 
shaping the “instituted process” and sowing the internal contradictions and overflows that give rise 
to a variety of locally-specific institutional configurations, and that ultimately lead to their rearrange-
ment within a differentiated global capitalist economy (Fernández et al., 2017). In sum, if we are to 
understand postneoliberalism, we must turn our attention to a situated, historical analysis of the dia-
lectic of de/marketization in a given context and remain attuned to the multiscalar dynamics that 
shape this process. Below, we develop our analytical framework by focusing our study on a particular 
commodity, the soybean. We briefly introduce the main elements of the soy boom before turning to 
analyze how land, labor, money, and, as we explain, knowledge were institutionally recalibrated in 
postneoliberal Argentina.  
3. The place of sojización in postneoliberal development  
 After the devastating consequences of neoliberal globalization became ever more difficult to 
contain, the postneoliberal development consensus was developed around a renewed policy script 
that informed left governments in the region, in particular Brazil and Argentina. The common de-
nominator of this consensus – influenced by neodesarrollismo (neo-developmentalism) as well as neoe-
structuralismo – was a more active role for the national state and a focus on social inclusion under mar-
ket conditions (Sunkel and Ramos, 1993). Through monetary policy, exchange rate management, se-
lective renationalization of vital sectors (e.g. resources, energy, infrastructure), and the use of subsi-
dies and tariffs, the state would be able to provide the conditions for a thriving, globally competitive 
export sector and to overcome its “dualist” production structure. This policy consensus did not sig-
nal a return to the interventionist state of “old” developmentalism advocated by Prebisch, Furtado 
and their inheritors, however (Ibid.). Instead, advocates pushed for a more indirect, facilitating state 
role that resonated with the post-Washington Consensus zeitgeist (Bresser-Pareira, 2011; Leiva, 
2008). The role for the state was to create an institutional framework that would cultivate “the crea-
tivity and dynamism of productive agents (entrepreneurs and workers) and [induce] their cooperation 
and coordination” (Sunkel and Ramos, 1993: 13; see also Werner et al., 2014). The postneoliberal de-
velopment consensus emphasized active industrial policies to escape the dependence on natural re-
source-intensive and cheap-labor exports (Leiva, 2008; Ocampo, 2016). However, most countries, in 
particular in South America, only saw the influence of the “primary sector” on production and the 
composition of exports increase throughout the 2000s (Bárcena Ibarra and Prado, 2016; Grugel and 
Riggirozzi, 2012). The targets of industrial policy shifted accordingly. While developmentalism of the 
mid-20th century, partially inspired by Prebischian structuralism, encouraged a subordination of the 
primary sector to industrialization by import substitution of manufactures, the post-neoliberal 
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development consensus was more ecumenical. Its defense of industrialization and the role of the 
internal market to strengthen employment and income distribution was no longer incompatible with 
primary sector activities, and, in Argentina, agriculture in particular. Primary activities could advance 
industrialization if they were incorporated into global production networks and subsequently 
achieved an improved position or better returns through various kinds of “upgrading.”  
“Popular nationalist” Argentina can in many ways be regarded as an exemplary case of how 
institutional recalibration to bridge redistributive and recognitional policies with primary sector accu-
mulation played out. Informed by the postneoliberal development framework, and restricted (as we 
discuss below) by global structural conditions, the two Kirchner administrations (2003-2007 and 
2007-2015) developed an optimistic, modernist vision of Argentinian agriculture that almost exclu-
sively centered around a single export: the soybean. In contrast to the more traditional crops driving 
Argentinian industrial agriculture, the soybean was a relatively recent arrival. Domestically, the crop 
was an integral part of Argentina’s “green revolution” during the 1960s and 1970s, when a capital and 
technology-intensive production model started to transform relations of production in the fertile 
grasslands, la pampa humeda. But the crop’s cultivation was relatively limited until the early 1990s, 
when the neoliberal government of Carlos Menem radically deregulated the country’s agricultural sec-
tor in the context of a global demand surge for inexpensive animal feed (Barri and Wahren, 2013). 
The Menem administration undertook several key reforms including the dismantling of the Junta 
Nacional de Granos (JNG), the state marketing board that centrally controlled the export of grains 
and oilseeds, and doing away with export taxes, or retenciones, on all grains while maintaining a re-
duced rate of 3.5% on soybeans and sunflowers (Rossi, n.y.; Slutzky, 2010). 
The production of soybeans culminated in a veritable boom during the 2000s as global mar-
ket prices rose sharply while Argentina found itself locked out of international financial markets fol-
lowing its debt default on the heels of the spectacular collapse of the Menem government’s radical 
neoliberal experiment. Geographically, soy expansion – or sojización, as the process is popularly 
known – left behind the agrarian heartland of la pampa humeda and expanded north- and northwest-
wards into the Argentinian chaco (Berndt and Bernhold 2017, Leguizamón 2014). These areas were 
hitherto scarcely integrated into export-oriented agriculture. Organizationally, a handful of Argentin-
ian agribusiness companies achieved dominance and notoriety in this period by contracting out in the 
value chain, above all upstream. Production inputs including land, machinery, seeds and all the neces-
sary technologies were leased or bought from partners, creating “asset light” production. The 
buzzwords of encadenamiento (linkage), producción en redes (network production) and agricultura sin agricul-
tores (farming without farmers) proliferated in industry and government discourses. 
  Beginning in the 1990s, a complex network of public, semi-public and private organizations 
– including value chain-oriented associations clustered around key export commodities – emerged. 
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These groups aimed to capture the “high road” in global markets by linking large corporate players 
with smaller ones, farmers with service-providers, primary producers with processing companies, 
producers with exporters and traders, and public and private organizations involved in R&D (Leiva, 
2008). They received support from the National Agricultural Technology Institute (INTA, in Spanish), 
founded in 1956 and largely independent from the political orientation of any particular government. 
The entanglement between state institutions and private agricultural capital was not confined to the 
national level. The technological and organizational changes were deeply imbricated with the global 
biotech industry and the corporate strategies of transnational companies such as Monsanto, Nidera 
and Syngenta. 
Consistent with neostructuralist nostrums, the Kirchner administrations continued to play a 
key facilitating role in the making of sojización. Both continued the commitment of previous govern-
ments to research and development, primarily via INTA. The ongoing expansion of soy was under-
written by a near omnipresent scientific-technological rationality in the state discourse, baldly dis-
played in the strategic agriculture plan presented by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s government in 
2011. Closely aligned with the postneoliberal agricultural policy vision, the Federal and Participative 
Agri-food and Agribusiness Strategic Plan 2010-2020 (PEAA, in Spanish) championed the development of 
“high-value” agriculture as a catalyst for national development. The engine of development was to be 
modern agribusiness operating in complex networks that would effectively erase “the boundaries 
among the primary, the industrial and the service sectors” (MAGyP, 2011: 43). 
In the wake of these geographical, organizational, policy and global market shifts, Argentina 
became a key player in the global soy market and the commodity took on paramount importance for 
its balance of trade. Agricultural commodities and meat regularly account for more than 50 per cent 
of the country’s exports, with soy alone responsible for roughly half of this proportion. In 2016, for 
instance, the soy complex (beans, meal and oil) had a 30% share of the country’s exports (INDEC, 
2016; see also Leguizamon, 2014). The dominance of soy is also reflected in the fact that about half 
of the country’s arable land is dedicated to soy production (49.3 % in 2015; FAOSTAT).  
 Rather than outright marketization or demarketization, however, we demonstrate below how 
the soy boom proliferated via an ambivalent institutional recalibration on the terrain of a neo-extrac-
tivist agricultural policy. The peculiar mix of continuity and change between the neoliberal discourse 
and policies of the 1990s and their contradictory recombination during the long 2000s can thus be 
conceptualized as the result of an institutional struggle between the rationalities of the market and 
state-directed development (Gago and Sztulwark, 2016). This is a struggle, however, that additionally 
involved civil society and social movements, which resisted the postneoliberal development consen-
sus and, in very different ways, pushed for redistribution. In the following section, we trace the 
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dialectic of de/marketization that instituted the postneoliberal soy complex through four “fictitious 
commodities:” money, land, labor, and, we add, knowledge.  
 
4. De/marketization of knowledge, money, land and labor in the soybean 
complex 
As any other market-oriented industrial activity, agroindustrial production and commerciali-
zation of the soybean is impossible without putting the “elements of industry on sale”. At the same 
time, the marketization of these fictitious commodities inevitably encounters limits, albeit with unde-
termined (and underspecified) results. In what follows, we illustrate the particular challenges faced in 
Argentina to demarketize fictitious commodities and to create the conditions to turn the country’s 
dependency on agricultural exports into positive redistributive effects. We organize our discussion 
around four fictitious commodities and the “four-cornered conceptual universe” (Peck, 2013a: 1559) 
offered by Polanyi’s ideal institutional types – markets, reciprocity, redistribution and householding. 
We analyze the actually existing combination of these institutional forms, which temporarily stabi-
lized the postneoliberal soy boom. First, we engage with the far-reaching technological package that 
transformed soy production, an example of the fictitious commodification of knowledge. As Jessop 
argues (2007), a profound social reorganization is required to transform knowledge from a collec-
tively generated resource to the bearer of capitalist value. This process produced both the marketiza-
tion of seeds as well as deliberate non-enforcement of intellectual property rights by the state, which 
we discuss as a form of redistribution. Second, we focus on “money” and the efforts of the Argentin-
ian state to manage the country’s export trade. This includes the question of how the country’s sub-
ordinate position in global financial markets forced its reliance on soy as a major earner of foreign 
exchange. We explore the mix of state policies to divert money flows to redistributive ends and the 
informal reciprocity networks that kickstarted the credit for the soy boom after the country’s debt 
crisis and subsequently consolidated into newfound forms of financialization. Third, we analyze the 
revaluation of land, the role of land rents and land use change in the process of sojización. This pro-
cess of fictitious commoditization has proven to be the most extreme and seen little effective mitiga-
tion by mixing with other institutional forms. And finally, we turn to the effects of these other pro-
cesses of fictitious commodification on labor. We highlight a paradoxical outcome: the Argentinian 
state sought to expand social protections in part by collecting rents from a commodity complex that 
has spurred widespread expulsion of agrarian labor. We summarize our discussion in Table 1, noting 
ways that each institutional recalibration to regulate these fictitious commodities produced overflows 
and resistances (column four). These overflows and forms of resistance in turn produced instabilities 
in the institutional arrangement that would eventually propel change. 
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[TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
a. De/marketization of knowledge: biotechnology, porous regulation and resistance 
 The soy harvested in Argentina is grown almost exclusively from transgenic seeds and thus 
intellectual property (IP) based agriculture (Brown-Keyder 2007). The application of a nuevo paquete 
tecnológico (Arceo et al., 2011) – a new technology package – has turned the crop into a symbol of a 
modernizing sector that stands every comparison with its counterparts in high-income countries such 
as the US. Allowing the adoption of double crop soybeans in rotation with wheat in areas where only 
one crop was planted before, GM seeds played a decisive role in the geographical expansion of soy 
and transformed the country into a veritable playground for the biotech industry (Barri and Wahren, 
2013; Gras and Hernández, 2013). An immediate effect of the nuevo paquete tecnológico driving soy pro-
duction in Argentina and elsewhere was producers’ increasing dependency on a small number of cor-
porate players. In addition to the domination of downstream activities such as processing and export-
ing by a handful of companies (e.g. Cargill, Bunge, Dreyfus, Nidera, AGD), the upstream side was 
controlled by the likes of Monsanto and Syngenta. The particular form of “produced socionature” 
associated with GM soy provided oligopolistic biotechnology companies with the opportunity to ex-
tract rents (e.g. royalties from seeds) based on IP rights that are normally safeguarded and enforced 
by the state (Andreucci et al., 2017; Lapegna, 2017; Vergara-Camus and Kay, 2017).  
But this is a marketization of knowledge and nature only to a certain extent. There are three 
ways in which it is possible to speak of incomplete marketization, revealing a more complex institu-
tional configuration to this process. The first concerns uneasy coexistence with state regulations on 
seeds. The country’s 1973 ley de semillas (seed law), designed to protect small farmers, gives producers 
unrestricted property rights over their own seeds. For companies such as Monsanto, expected to 
forego royalties, the apparent lack of “an adequate and effective system (...) to protect the intellectual 
property rights of new plant varieties or plant-related technology” (Yankelevich, 2016: 18) has been 
an ongoing issue. There have been continuous struggles between biotech firms, farmers associations 
and the state around this issue. Governments of different political stripes have so far made half-
hearted attempts to meet the demands of seed corporations, but have ultimately proven to be re-
sistant to changing the law (Barri and Wahren, 2013), illustrating how the state is capable of setting 
limits against the unfettered marketization of “socionature”. 
Second, there is also a degree of redistribution “from below” and householding. The latter is 
most obvious in farmers’ practice of setting aside a portion of their harvest for their own future pro-
duction. In addition to this practice, a burgeoning black market in seeds, called the bolsa blanca, is 
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organized by farmers who store retained seeds for subsequent sale, often using crop that has been 
taken out of circulation by underreporting harvest (see below) and storing in farmers’ own facilities. 
It has proven largely impossible to control whether soy growing in a given field is from seeds legally 
retained for own use or acquired from unauthorized traders. The Argentinian Government estimated 
recently that only 30% of soy producers use seeds that are formally certified (Ministerio de Agroin-
dustria, 2016: 13). While bolsa blanca seeds circulate primarily on the informal, black market, one can 
read the existence of this widespread market – the result of state non-enforcement and farmer tenac-
ity against knowledge enclosure – as a form of redistribution in so far as it undermines corporate ef-
forts to collect technology rents.  
As the key corporate actor in the transgenic seed trade, Monsanto fought back and at-
tempted to close the loopholes hampering its collection of technology rents on seed. With the intro-
duction of a new generation of transgenic soy seeds deliberately designed for the arid conditions 
dominant in many Argentinian production areas (called soja intacta), Monsanto attempted to push 
through a complex new royalty system that would have effectively privatized the control of national 
seed laws (Bolsa de Cereales, 2015, Yankelevich, 2016). At the time of writing, even the current mar-
ket-liberal government under Macri blocked this attempt, in return promising the long-awaited re-
form of the ley de semillas and amending it to include intellectual property rights.  
The third dimension of incomplete marketization stems from the overflows associated with 
the fictitious commodification of nature (Castree 2003): the extent to which genetic modification of 
organisms comes up against its ecological and social limits. On the one hand, there is the resistance 
of nature which manifests in the fact that every sociotechnical fix to the perceived production prob-
lems of intensive agriculture appears to be only temporarily successful and quickly produces its own 
particular lines of flight. So-called superweeds have developed resistance to glyphosate, the key herbi-
cide of the technology package, and yields have declined over time, necessitating adjustments and 
leading to the introduction of a second generation of glyphosate-resistant soybean varieties globally. 
On the other hand, there is human resistance in the form of social movements emerging from peas-
ant and/or indigenous communities, and ecological activism (Vergara-Camus and Kay, 2017). One 
graphic illustration is the fierce resistance against Monsanto in the Córdoba region. This includes the 
long-term campaign led by women activists of the Ituzaingó neighborhood in Córdoba for recogni-
tion of the dramatic health effects of the controversial practice of aerial glyphosate application with 
small planes and drones (Madres de Ituzaingó). This movement was also part of an alliance of move-
ments that successfully fought against the construction of one of the largest Monsanto seed pro-
cessing plants in the neighboring town of Malvinas Argentinas, led by the group “Asamblea Malvinas 
Lucha por la Vida”. 
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b. Money, credit and resistance to redistribution 
It would be inaccurate to attribute the explosive increase of soy production and the soy ex-
port boom solely to productivity gains resulting from biotech-induced changes, however. The breath-
taking story of sojización is in part due to the far-reaching changes in Argentina’s currency regime, 
credit access, and efforts to divert returns from the boom to underwrite public goods. In short, the 
struggle over the market-led regulation of “money” in its many forms reveals the efforts to construct 
a new institutional arrangement, one that ultimately emboldened the forces that would lead to post-
neoliberalism’s undoing in the country.  
Shortly after the end of the controversial Menem era, the convertibility regime that had es-
tablished parity between Argentinian and US currencies, and formed the corner stone of subsequent 
privatization and deregulation measures, collapsed. The effect was a sudden peso devaluation of 
about 300 percent and the implementation of a new “post-convertability” currency regime. The re-
sulting social tensions eventually prepared the ground for the election of (left) Peronist Néstor Kirch-
ner in 2003 (Basualdo, 2006). The peso devaluation obviously benefitted export-oriented sectors at 
the expense of domestic ones, sparking sharp production increases in export agriculture (Arceo et al., 
2011). Soy, in particular, became highly competitive in the general context of high commodity prices 
during the 2000s as producers sold their product in dollars and paid their production costs in deval-
ued currency. However, underneath this impressive performance lurked a familiar problem of pri-
mary resource dependent economies in the medium term: the negative effect of commodity exports 
on the industrial base of the countries in question, often labeled “Dutch disease” by economists. The 
enormous profitability of primary commodity exports diverts resources from industrial activities to-
wards mining and agriculture. The resulting increase in the inflow of US Dollars puts pressure on the 
real exchange rate, making the Dollar cheaper relative to the local currency and/or increasing local 
prices in Dollar terms (Féliz, 2013). Aware of this problem, proponents of postneoliberal develop-
mentalist policy gave the state a crucial role in mitigating “Dutch disease”-type effects via the often-
prescribed medicine of managing the floating exchange rate to minimize the harm caused to those 
sectors with limited or no access to foreign exchange (Bresser-Pereira, 2011). 
  In Argentina, the gap between the real effective exchange rate and the official, managed ex-
change rate indeed widened during the post-convertibility era. This led to a structural imbalance that 
undermined the competitiveness of domestic vis-à-vis foreign capital, a pressure that the more com-
petitive agro-commodity sector was better able to bear than the manufacturing sector, providing fur-
ther momentum to an ongoing deindustrialization process (Palma, 2008). Together with the booming 
commodity prices globally, this generated significantly higher margins for producers and other corpo-
rate actors across the soy commodity complex and allowed them to capture extraordinary returns ef-
fectively by shifting income to the agroindustrial sector (Arceo et al., 2011). As in other Latin 
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American countries, this phenomenon has also been described in Argentina as the reprimarización of 
the economy (Azpiazu et al., 2011; Ocampo, 2016; cf. Córdoba et al., 2017).  
In addition to tensions in the institutionalization of currency exchange, the temporary re-
structuring of the domestic credit market had a major impact on the soy boom. One side effect of 
the collapse of the convertibility regime was a complete meltdown of the domestic banking sector. 
Thus, agricultural producers found it difficult to borrow money at a time when global markets of-
fered new export opportunities. As a response, they took matters in their own hands, increasingly im-
plementing collective solutions to the credit problem. These efforts typically involved the simple 
pooling of money and risk amongst family members, close friends and producers from their respec-
tive regions. The collectively pooled money was then used to finance production. In Argentina, this 
practice is known as a pool de siembra (sowing pool). But the spectacular increases in global demand 
and profitability resulted in an ever more urgent thirst for credit, transforming this relatively informal 
practice of credit provision embedded in kin and community networks into a formalized arrangement 
that incorporated more far-flung investors (source: interview with pool de siembra entrepreneur, 29 Oc-
tober 2014). This new arrangement was modeled on the fideicomiso, similar to the Anglo-Saxon “trust 
fund”, an extremely flexible form that can be adapted for a wide range of purposes.  
In its mobilization by the agricultural sector, the fideicomiso was introduced to formalize the 
pool de siembra model in two ways. The first is the fideicomiso ordinario agrícola. This construction in-
creased the level of security for investors because the respective legal norm codified the roles, rights 
and obligations of each party involved (trustor/beneficiary, trustee, operator/producer), and in so 
doing, regulated the entire endeavor. The so-called fideicomiso financiero agrícola went a step further, add-
ing a private, financial market security layer to the codified norm. This variant is traded on financial 
markets (bolsa de valores) and as a securitized instrument is additionally subject to the valuation of risk 
rating agencies, accounting audits and the technical monitoring of operations on the ground.  
The formalization of the pool de siembra attracted a large number of non-agricultural investors, ranging 
from individuals in search of profitable opportunities to invest their private savings to corporate 
players from other sectors, both national and international. Given that the more sophisticated ar-
rangements involved considerably higher transactions costs, they were mainly utilized for large-scale 
and riskier activities. It is not surprising that these arrangements drove the aggressive expansion of 
the soy commodity frontier into more marginal areas in the north (Fernández, 2012, Pertierra 
Canepa, 2014). In light of these developments, a large part of soy production became thoroughly fi-
nancialized. The growing imprint of a financial market rationality was exacerbated further by the ever 
more prominent role of commodity futures markets, led by the Chicago Board of Trade and the 
fledging activities of Argentina’s ROFEX (Rosario Futures Exchange) and MATBA (Mercado a 
Término de Buenos Aires). In short, the demise of the market-radical era of the 1990s resulted in a 
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new currency regime that unleashed a hitherto unprecedented boom in soy production and exports 
while limiting credit; the credit shortages at a time of extraordinary investment opportunities led to 
first informal, reciprocal modes of allocation, followed swiftly by formal, financialized ones. The re-
sult was an increasing role of financial markets in agriculture and, at least to a certain degree, a loss of 
control by the state.  
Indeed, while producers sought creative means to access credit in the immediate aftermath 
of the currency collapse, the Argentine government was cut off from a hostile global financial envi-
ronment after its debt default, and embroiled for years in a bitter struggle with “vulture funds” fol-
lowing debt restructuring in 2005. The Kirchner governments had little choice but to support pri-
mary activities as the only reliable source of the export earnings needed for their ambitious redistrib-
utive development program and productive investments in the domestic economy. Thus, the govern-
ment sought to channel agricultural commodity exports and to absorb a proportion of the export 
earnings. It performed this tight-rope walk with two interrelated interventions. First, to meet the ur-
gent need to secure access to food at affordable prices, key agricultural products such as wheat and 
beef were needed domestically. In such a situation, and certainly aided by rising demand and prices 
globally, soy was almost without alternative as a source of foreign exchange. The Kirchner govern-
ment established a complicated agricultural trade regime that involved a skillful construction of 
“smart” market borders, discriminating both between commodities and within specific commodity 
chains. This was to be achieved with a mix of regulatory devices, ranging from export taxes, export 
quotas and import restrictions to price controls or compensations for negatively affected industrial 
producers (Regúnaga and Tejeda Rodriguez, 2015). In line with the discriminatory treatment of key 
agricultural commodities, only soy enjoyed unhindered access to world markets (aside from the ex-
port tax of course), while wheat, maize and beef were subject to stringent export controls. In so do-
ing, clear incentives were given to farmers to produce soy at the expense of more traditional com-
modities. The second intervention concerns the active management and discriminatory imposition of 
retenciones (export taxes) on the main agricultural commodities. As mentioned earlier, retenciones have a 
varied and contested history in the country that reaches back to the 1950s. They were reintroduced in 
full force in 2002 shortly before the election of Néstor Kirchner. Oilseed derivatives were taxed more 
lightly in order to stimulate upgrading from the raw production to a processed derivative. The first 
Kirchner administration implemented further increases exclusively for soy and its derivatives in Janu-
ary 2007 (Rossi, n.y.). 
The peculiar mix of export incentives and protectionist measures implemented by the Kirch-
ner governments turned out to be too contradictory to be sustainable in the end. There were two in-
terrelated reasons for this. The first is external and concerns the dependence of the redistributive pol-
icy on global commodity prices. When global soy prices became volatile with particularly sharp 
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downturns in 2008 and again from 2013 onwards, the limits of this particular strategy became obvi-
ous. Second, the price downturn meant that the underlying internal tensions were ever more difficult 
to contain. These tensions came to the fore when Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was forced to re-
voke the controversial introduction of flexible soy retenciones in 2008 that were pegged to market 
prices and would have meant an increase at that time. In their analysis of the far-reaching agrarian 
conflict that crystallized around this decision, Teubal and Palmisano (2010) indicate that the income 
generated with export taxes was in fact surprisingly small, putting in sharp relief the enormous sym-
bolic quality of the events and a testimony to the unwillingness or inability of the state to capture soy 
rents through this mechanism. The conflict nonetheless provided agrarian elites with the means to 
unify what had long been a deeply fragmented agrarian sector under the identity of el campo, or the 
countryside. This shift polarized society and eventually shattered the pluralist alliance that had 
formed the basis of kirchnerismo (Barri and Wahren, 2013; Lapegna, 2017; Teubal and Palmisano, 
2010). The Kirchner government’s continuing anti-capitalist rhetoric notwithstanding, agricultural 
policy in the years following the conflict favoured large agribusiness and transnational capital even 
more than before. At the end of the day, the struggle around retenciones gave further impetus to an on-
going concentration process that saw large producers increasing their control over a growing propor-
tion of arable land (Fernández, 2013) and revealing the extent to which the Argentinian state had 
only limited room to maneuver politically.  
We interpret the 2008 struggle around the retenciones and the distribution of extractive rents 
as an example of the limits of selective demarketization (counter)movements by the state. This par-
ticular example took the form of (relatively rare) open resistance. But there are additional, more sub-
tle ways in which the agroindustrial sector undermined the state’s attempt to control the distribution 
of extractive rents and accumulated surplus in the soy sector. This concerns in particular widespread, 
but difficult to quantify practices to evade the state’s fiscal grip. Corporate actors and landholders 
regularly devalued income streams and overvalued expenses in order to reduce their income and 
value added tax burdens. Upstream in the commodity chain, farmers who leased out land avoided 
taxes by reporting lower costs for land leases and receiving the difference between the official price 
and the market price in cash illegally. A more widely used method was to underreport the volume of 
the harvest. Legally, producers are required to report their harvest at the end of the production cam-
paign. Utilizing own storage facilities, the underreported soy was stored and then sold on the black 
market without applying retenciones and other taxes. This second method was also used to store seed 
for the bolsa blanca, as discussed above. In both cases, the extra money was legalized by investments 
in machinery or infrastructure (see Comba, 2018 for a fascinating case-study of these practices in the 
Córdoba region). At the commercialization end, a practice of “triangulation” became widespread, in-
volving global commodity exporters and traders such as Cargill and Bunge. Soy (or any other 
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commodity) was sold to a country such as China, but the official recipient was a client in Uruguay, 
who issued a discounted invoice. Because of the high volatility of soy prices globally, this method 
was very difficult to detect as long as reported prices were plausible (see Pagina12, 2012; La Nación, 
2008). When discussed with agribusiness managers and farmers, these practices were routinely legiti-
mized in a contradictory discourse that represented the state as both greedy and intrusive, as well as 
feeble and corrupt. In a situation where the state takes more than it is entitled to and when the col-
lected money is misused, so the argument goes, tax evasion is a legitimate act of resistance (Comba, 
2018; interview with farmer in the Córdoba region, 4 April 2018). Although these practices are cer-
tainly not exclusive to the Kirchner years, these “informal” challenges to the sovereignty of the state 
served to further polarize the public debate, above all during the presidency of Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner. 
All in all, these struggles to regulate money flows in and through the soy complex, managing 
currency and steering returns towards redistributive projects faced numerous limits. The fight over 
retenciones in particular mobilized a rural bloc against an “anti-market” state, a state to be sure that was 
increasingly forced to side with agribusiness in practice, despite its anti-capitalist rhetoric. Accord-
ingly, it is the political legacy of the 2008 conflict, and not the limited monies redistributed via reten-
ciones, that is of importance for our argument. This became obvious when the market-liberal Mauricio 
Macri won the Presidential election in 2015 with the help of a unified rural vote. One of the first de-
cisions of the new President was to appoint one of the leading voices in the 2008 agrarian conflict as 
Minister (Lapegna, 2017) and to phase out retenciones despite facing a deep fiscal and social crisis.  
c. The de/marketization of land and labor 
The institutional struggles outlined above crystallize in particular ways on the terrain of what 
are certainly the most commonly discussed Polanyian fictitious commodities: land and labor. Strug-
gles over the appropriation of land and the ambivalent ways in which labor is incorporated into capi-
talist agriculture have always been at the center of the agrarian question. A great irony of the transla-
tion of postneoliberal development in Argentina, and the attendant vision of socially-inclusive 
growth, was its seemingly intractable dependence upon a soft commodity that simultaneously radical-
ized the marketization of agricultural land and was perhaps the most hostile of all crops towards la-
bor. In Argentina, we are confronted with the impossible situation of seeking to achieve redistribu-
tion and social protection of labor by pushing for a brutal marketization of nature that played a cru-
cial role in displacing workers in the first place. It is to the struggles over the marketization of land 
and the ambivalent ways in which labor is incorporated into the soy production model that we now 
turn.  
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It is difficult to overemphasize the radical changes to rural land markets spurred by the soci-
otechnical and organizational transformations and the processes of financialization discussed above. 
Given the importance of control over land for agricultural production, the new “asset light” produc-
tion model required hyper-flexible access to land. The main players involved in production activities 
therefore increasingly prioritized the short-term leasing of land over direct acquisition. This started 
with the dominant corporate players, such as the pioneer of agricultura sin agricultores, the agribusiness 
firm Los Grobo, and the larger pools de siembra1, and eventually also extended towards more traditional 
family farmers2, commonly referred to in Argentina as chacareros. Land leasing thus became the domi-
nant practice during the boom years. And although there is no systematic and reliable data on the 
practice, scattered evidence suggests that by the early 2010s, approximately half the arable land under 
production was marketized under leasing arrangement of one to two years (Bertello, 2013; Grosso et 
al., 2010; Slutzky, 2010). 
The elevated capital intensity of soy production placed tremendous pressure on family farm-
ers in those areas that have a longer history of export-oriented production. This holds above all for 
the pampa humeda. Here, chacareros had a difficult choice to make: either adapt to the new times and 
expand and grow, emulating the pools de siembra and the likes of Los Grobo, or be forced out of busi-
ness. The first option was only possible by leasing large quantities of land, mostly from those farmers 
forced to follow the second path. The latter group subsequently turned into rentiers: they extracted 
all or part of the value from their land through rent relations, giving the “farming without farmers” 
model a particular twist (Andreucci et al., 2017). For the former group, the pressure to acquire capital 
to buy or lease land resulted in a financialization of everyday life, submitting farmers to the discipli-
nary whip of debt and forcing them to increase income to be able to repay their loans (Vergara-Ca-
mus and Kay, 2017). In addition to widespread, short-term leasing, larger agribusiness companies 
such as Adecoagro increasingly became land traders by acquiring land cheaply only to resell it after 
increasing its productive potential (e.g. Adecoagro, 2014). 
                                                   
1 In parts of the scholarly literature and the public debate, companies such as Los Grobo are also labelled pools 
de siembra. However, while they adopt similar organizational practices, including the use of fideicomisos financieros, 
it makes sense to use the term more narrowly for arrangements that are driven by normally little-known service 
and consulting firms that have specialized in setting up sowing pools. 
2 We use the term as it is traditionally understood in Argentina for the capitalized agribusinesses that have his-
torically dominated production in the agricultural heartland. These are capitalized farms, hiring waged labor and 
producing for export markets, and should be distinguished from “peasant” or “small” farmers (Lapegna 2017: 
314). 
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The multiplication of forms to commodify land, and in particular, a compression of lease 
contract length aided by accelerated turnover time of the crop, yielded good returns and greatly in-
creased the demand for arable land as “stock” to place into these circuits. Particular regions experi-
enced a veritable land rush as lease prices reached hitherto unprecedented levels. There was a distinct 
geography to this process, illustrating how ground rent always plays a coordinating role, distributing 
investments across space in deeply uneven ways (Andreucci et al., 2017). In the agrarian heartland, 
growing demand for agricultural land and increasing prices gave further impetus to sojización as pro-
ducers in the region could only recoup their considerable investments when planting soy (Gras and 
Hernández, 2013). Traditional commodities such as maize or meat were crowded out as a result and 
the tenure concentration process was accelerated. In the soy frontier regions of the north and north-
west, a process of violent dispossession took hold. Here, land was traditionally used communally by 
indigenous and criollo (small peasant) families for extensive livestock breeding in the monte ecosystem. 
In other words, land had been mainly used collectively for subsistence and local marketing, and was 
therefore not integrated into capitalist agricultural production prior to the soy boom (Barri and Wah-
ren, 2013, Gordillo, 2014). The spatial expansion of the soy complex was driven by larger scale, for-
malized sowing pools, which remained largely invisible to the local population because of their 
opaque ownership structures (Grosso et al., 2010). When looking at the land rush in parts of rural 
Argentina, state actors at different spatial scales largely refrained from using their power as regulators 
of property rights in support of the claims made by marginalized farmers. Instead, widespread collu-
sion between local state representatives and agribusiness capital, including a culture of “looking 
away,” as well as non-action on the part of the national government, fomented violent dispossession 
along the soy frontier (Lapegna, 2017).  
These developments are deeply intertwined with the question of the de/marketization of la-
bor, again with regional variation. When looking at waged labor in the narrow sense, we are con-
fronted with an ongoing process of “deproletarianization” in the pampa humeda. The increasing capital 
intensity of soy production reduced the need for manual workers, leading to a massive expulsion of 
agrarian labor (Lattuada and Neiman, 2005). A diminished number of seasonal laborers remained, 
hired mainly by a growing number of contratistas, service providers whose activities became central to 
the “asset-light” network production system pioneered by the soy complex. These subcontracted 
workers were subject to increasing exploitation rates, earning some of the lowest wages nationally in 
a sector that registers amongst the most productive in the Argentinian economy (Villulla, 2015). 
In a parallel process, producers in the agrarian heartland in particular saw an unprecedented 
moment of professionalization (Gras and Hernández, 2013). A new “technocratic” class comprised 
of agrarian engineers and economists emerged that was not embedded locally and formed its identity 
in relation to its command over commodified scientific knowledge. Both anti-kirchnerist sources and 
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those close to the Kirchner administrations celebrated this new class, embodied in the figure of the 
new entrepreneurial Argentinian producer. The PEAA mentioned above, for instance, represented 
the “new 21st century rural producer” as an entrepreneurial subject with a “clearly positive attitude” 
towards the implementation of state of the art technology, always eager – having internalized a “spirit 
of productivity” – to maximize profits without asking for subsidies; always ready to take risks against 
all odds instead of asking for protection by the state; and equipped with degrees in agrarian science, 
business management and organization studies (MAGyP, 2011: 44). 
  In the wake of these changes, the traditional social relations defining the rural chacarero cul-
ture were disrupted, and new social inequalities were inscribed within existing ones. In addition to the 
expulsion of the many subjects that simply no longer fit in this production model, traditional power 
hierarchies and remaining rural livelihoods were transformed as social complexity increased, rearticu-
lating insider and outsider positions while preserving extreme inequalities in income and access to 
land (see, for instance, Basualdo and Arceo, 2010; Palmisano, 2014). The Argentinian state, once 
again, played a very ambivalent role in these processes, by and large doing little to set limits on the 
expulsion or exploitation of labor in the wake of the soybean’s ever-tightening grip over the national 
political economy. Indeed, it is in the realm of labor relations in agriculture that the continuity with 
the earlier market-radical neoliberal period is most obvious. Both Kirchner administrations failed to 
implement a long overdue reform of the 1970s labor law for farmworkers. Hourly wages for farm-
workers continued to be amongst the lowest in the country and irregular work without social security 
and excessive working hours became the norm in the sector. At the same time, the postneoliberal 
government did nothing to restore even a fledgling degree of collective representation for farmwork-
ers after rural unions ceased to play a meaningful role during the Menem years (Villulla, 2015). Rural 
labor effectively became invisible in the public imagination, replaced by the entrepreneurial producer 
celebrated by the state and agribusiness alike (ibid.).  
One could argue that the decreasing income inequality registered nationally during the first 
half of the 2000s and the introduction of social assistance and cash transfer programs for disadvan-
taged groups of the population provides at least some positive evidence for the reformist, redistribu-
tive character of the postneoliberal project. While this has undoubtedly been the case, it can also be 
seen differently. As Verónica Gago recently pointed out, rather than the exractivist model providing 
the redistributive means for social inclusion, the largely consumerist progressive social policies of the 
Kirchner era may have stabilized the exploitative activities of transnational agribusiness (Gago, 2014). 
It is not far-fetched to conclude that some of the workers and peasant farmers displaced by the soy 
boom in the pampa humeda and the Argentinian chaco became recipients of the various programs of 
social assistance lauded as the progressive heart of kirchnerismo. As Gago (2014) points out, livelihood 
strategies of the income-poor and unemployed exhibited a contradictory articulation of everyday 
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practices that combined a calculative ethos with communitarian forms and popular strategies of get-
ting by, forming popular subjectivities that give rise to a pluralist “neoliberalism from below”. 
5. Conclusion 
A Polanyian analysis of Latin American postneoliberalism must do more than gesture to-
wards pendular movements between market and state/society. Contributing to the impetus of a Po-
lanyian economic geography, we have therefore offered a finer-grained approach that refracts 
de/marketization through Polanyi’s institutional forms and conceptualizes the underlying processes 
as struggles over their ambivalent recalibration. Incorporating insights from Latin American structur-
alism, we have also insisted that this process is multi-scalar: the temporary stabilization of an institu-
tional mix in society, to recall Burawoy, is determined by local and extra-local forces. Various actors 
involved in recalibration struggles regularly transgress the remit of the national scale. In Argentina, by 
adhering to neodevelopmentalist policy to bolster global market integration via the primary sector, 
the state once again became a prisoner of an export strategy highly dependent on agro-industrial 
commodities, incorporated into global commodity chains that were controlled by external and in-
creasingly financialized actors, with exclusionary and inequitable socio-productive effects. 
Scholars must tread carefully between the Scylla of all-determining global forces and the 
Charybdis of national particularism, however. For our part, we mobilize peripheralization as a mul-
tiscalar and fragmented process, rather than a foregone conclusion. This perspective crucially in-
cludes a sensitivity towards the various overflows and limits to the temporary arrangement of the het-
erodox institutional forms in the de/marketization of knowledge, money, land and labor. On the one 
hand, these contradictions provide openings for resistance against neoliberal marketization, such as 
protests by local and national activists and emergent natures that defy socio-technical fixes. On the 
other hand, the frictions in the development model also motivate practices that ultimately stabilize 
the extractivist model. These include “informal” attempts by rural actors to bypass the state’s efforts 
to regulate the value chain, as well as – despite their fundamentally different logic – the kind of plu-
ralist practices of “getting by” identified by Gago. The underlying contradictions that roiled within 
the Kirchner project were, ultimately, too strong to be contained. A “pluralist hegemony” (Lapegna, 
2017) gave way to a polarized society wherein a reunified “campo” – allied to important segments of 
the urban middle class – formed a power bloc that would become the basis for a renewed form of 
neoliberalism.  
It is sobering, but perhaps not entirely surprising in the light of these findings, to see how a 
market-radical and authoritarian counter-movement finally brought postneoliberal hopes to an ab-
rupt end. The election of Mauricio Macri in 2015 constituted a sharp rupture with the Kirchner years 
and the new government applied a mix of neoliberal and authoritarian policies typical of 
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right/center-right governments in Latin America. Mirroring the too-stark characterization of the 
postneoliberal interlude as societal reaction to market overreach, the toxic policy cocktail pushed by 
the current government cannot adequately be represented as a pendular (re)marketization for at least 
three reasons. First, macrismo continues to face its internal limits as the ungrateful beneficiaries of the 
policy turn have refused to invest their extraordinary profits domestically and instead have moved 
their money abroad. Second, Macri’s increasingly authoritarian state is mobilizing a mix of austerity 
and violence against indigenous groups, unions, environmental activists, poor campesinos, and women. 
Lastly, the unfettered capacity of society to mobilize large-scale protests and strikes continues to 
hamper the government’s designs. Indeed, the Macri Government has had to adopt a similar experi-
mental and contradictory trial and error approach as previous administrations, notwithstanding the 
drastic differences in policy content. At the time of writing, the long-promised abolition of the reten-
ciones has been postponed, import restrictions remain in place, and attempts to manage the exchange 
rate have backfired as devaluation-fueled inflation has led to sharply declining real wages – develop-
ments that fuel widespread and socially heterogeneous protests (see Hudson 2018; Manzanelli et al. 
2017; Neffa 2017). It remains to be seen whether the current reinvigoration of political struggle will 
succeed in defeating the authoritarian neoliberal turn, and whether this will lead to new forms of reg-
ulatory recombination that will learn from, and improve upon, the postneoliberal arrangement. 
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